Data-Driven Structural BVAR Analysis of Unconventional Monetary Policy by Puonti, Päivi
öMmföäflsäafaäsflassflassflas
fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff
Discussion Papers
Data-Driven Structural BVAR Analysis of
Unconventional Monetary Policy
Päivi Puonti
University of Helsinki and HECER
Discussion Paper No. 406
December 2016
ISSN 1795-0562
HECER – Helsinki Center of Economic Research, P.O. Box 17 (Arkadiankatu 7), FI-00014
University of Helsinki, FINLAND,
Tel +358-2941-28780, E-mail info-hecer@helsinki.fi, Internet www.hecer.fi
HECER
Discussion Paper No. 406
Data-Driven Structural BVAR Analysis of
Unconventional Monetary Policy*
Abstract
We apply a novel Bayesian structural vector autoregressive method to analyze the
macroeconomic effects of unconventional monetary policy in Japan, the US and the euro
area. The method exploits statistical properties of the data to uniquely identify the model
without restrictions, and thus enables formal assessment of the plausibility of given sign
restrictions. Unlike previous research, the data-based analysis reveals differences in the
output and price effects of the Bank of Japan's, Federal Reserve's and European Central
Bank's balance sheet operations.
JEL Classification: C11, C32, C52, E52
Keywords: unconventional monetary policy, Bayesian structural vector autoregression,
identification
Päivi Puonti
Department of Political and Economic Studies
University of Helsinki
P.O. Box 17 (Arkadiankatu 7)
FI-00014 University of Helsinki
FINLAND
e-mail: paivi.puonti@helsinki.fi
* The author would like to thank Markku Lanne, Jani Luoto, Juha Tervala and the
participants of various workshops and seminars for helpful comments. Financial support
from the Eino Jutikkala Fund is gratefully acknowledged.
1 Introduction
Many central banks undertook unconventional monetary policy (UMP)
measures in the aftermath of the 2007-09 nancial crisis to restore the
normal functioning of the monetary transmission mechanism when the
policy rates reached the zero lower bound of interest rates (ZLB), or to
provide further stimulus to the economy. Each central bank adopted mea-
sures deemed most suitable to the circumstances of its currency area (See
Fawley and Neely (2013) and Ugai (2007) for reviews). This means that
country-specic results can be thought to reect the e¤ectiveness of various
measures (Gambacorta et al. 2014) but also that the experience of Japan,
which has the longest history of UMP at the ZLB, cannot necessarily be
generalized to other countries.
While conventional monetary policy targets low and stable ination
with a short-term interest rate as an instrument, UMP commonly con-
sists of massive expansion of central banksbalance sheets and/or aims to
inuence longer term interest rates. In addition to the adoption of new
monetary policy tools, utilizing standard tools more frequently, intensely
or for non-standard purposes can be classied as UMP. In this paper UMP
refers to the use of the central banks balance sheet as a monetary pol-
icy instrument, also called balance sheet policiesby Borio and Disyatat
(2010).1
Although there is some empirical evidence that unconventional mea-
1This deliberate choice thus rules out those central banks operations that leave the
size of its balance sheet una¤ected, for example the Federal Reserves (Fed) maturity
extension program known as Operation Twist, and the central banks use of commu-
nication about future policy decisions. However the choice is not necessarily restrictive.
According to Cecioni et al. (2011), the communication of future interest rates belongs
to the toolkit of some central banks even in normal times so that it is not clear whether
communication can be regarded as an unconventional monetary policy measure at all.
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sures have been e¤ective in inuencing nancial and macroeconomic vari-
ables (Cecioni et al. 2011), there is still considerable uncertainty around the
quantication of those e¤ects (Joyce et al. 2012). The relatively limited
literature analyzing the macroeconomic e¤ects of central banksbalance
sheet policies mostly uses structural vector autoregressions.2 In the few
studies (Meinusch and Tillmann 2016, Weale and Wieladek 2016, Boeckx
et al. 2016, Gambacorta et al. 2014, Schenkelberg and Watzka 2013) fo-
cusing on the macroeconomic e¤ects over a sample period during which
central banks actually targeted macroeconomic conditions, no major dif-
ferences between the countries arise. Specically, an expansionary UMP
shock is found to lead to a delayed signicant temporary rise in output and
prices in all countries, and the results are robust to alternative variables.
Structural vector autoregressions (SVARs) identied by sign restric-
tions are common in the literature analyzing conventional or unconven-
tional monetary policy. In the UMP literature, sign restrictions are often
combined with short-run zero restrictions in order to reduce the set of ad-
missible impulse responses and hence to sharpen identication. In some
cases the additional zero restrictions are also needed to disentangle the
UMP-shock from the business cycle or nancial shocks (e.g. Gambacorta
et al. 2014, Schenkelberg and Watzka 2013). As the theoretical founda-
tions of UMP are not well established, both the signs and their restriction
horizons are inevitably arbitrary. Obviously, if we are interested in the
2The biggest strand of empirical UMP literature consists of event studies based on
policy announcements. The limitation of the event-study literature is the narrow focus
on high-frequency nancial data. Event studies assume an immediate response of the
variables of interest although the exact timing and duration of a policy intervention
cannot be known (Martin et al. 2012), while macroeconomic variables such as output and
ination generally respond with a lag. Therefore this line of research is not appropriate
to analyze macroeconomic e¤ects (Joyce et al. 2012) and mostly concerns UMPs impact
on the nancial market (Meinusch and Tillmann 2016).
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macroeconomic e¤ects of certain policy, it is particularly desirable to leave
the responses of macrovariables unrestricted.
To the best of our knowledge, the so-called statistical identication
methods have not yet been employed in the UMP literature.3 These meth-
ods facilitate statistical testing of exactly identifying short-run or long-run
restrictions in SVAR models (see e.g. Lanne et al. 2016), whereas methods
to assess the plausibility of sign restrictions have been either informal or dif-
cult to generalize (see Lanne and Luoto 2016, and the references therein).
In this paper we employ the method recently put forth by Lanne and Lu-
oto (2016) that exploits the statistical properties of the data to uniquely
identify a SVAR model and enables the evaluation of the plausibility of
sign restrictions by their probabilities of being compatible with the data.
This is helpful in either labeling the statistically identied shocks, which
do not carry any economic meaning as such, or in concluding that the sign
restrictions imposed in the previous literature are not supported.
Apart from being able to assess the plausibility of sign restrictions, our
approach has a number of additional benets compared to the conventional
approach to sign restrictions. First, it should yield more accurate impulse
response functions. This follows from the fact that our impulse response
analysis relies only on economic shocks that are found to plausibly satisfy
the given restrictions. Second, since our model is uniquely identied, the
uncertainty surrounding the impulse responses of sign and other set iden-
tied models the so-called model identication problem (see e.g. Fry and
Pagan 2011)  disappears and reporting the results of impulse response
analysis is straightforward. Furthermore, a genuinely uninformative prior
can be used, allowing us to learn about the impulse responses from the
3As examples of using statistical information to identify conventional monetary policy
shocks, see Bacchiocchi et al. (forthcoming), Lanne, Meitz and Saikkonen (2016), Lanne
and Lütkepohl (2014), Normandin and Phaneuf (2004).
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data.
We nd statistical support for the sign restrictions used in a number of
previous studies in all three currency areas. This allows us to interpret the
statistically identied shocks and impulse responses along the lines of our
reference studies (Schenkelberg and Watzka 2013, Gambacorta et al. 2014,
Boeckx et al. 2016). However, our impulse responses of these shocks di¤er
in interesting ways from those reported in these studies.
Importantly, unlike previous research, our analysis reveals di¤erences
in the macroeconomic impact of the three central banksactions. Our un-
restricted impulse response functions indicate that a UMP shock did not
have a statistically signicant impact on the consumer price index (CPI) in
Japan, while there is weak evidence of a lagged, positive impact on prices
in the US and in the euro area, depending on the specication. Our results
also point to an immediate positive output response in the euro area, to a
more delayed and persistent impact in the US than previously found, and
that the positive output e¤ect in Japan was unlikely due to lower long-term
interest rates. The di¤erences in the e¤ectiveness of the balance sheet oper-
ations can be explained by the di¤erences in the unconventional measures
adopted by the three central banks.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Technical details of the
econometric method are given in Section 2. Section 3 covers the empirical
analysis and Section 4 concludes the paper.
2 Methodology
Structural vector autoregressions (SVARs) are a common tool to analyze
conventional monetary policy. Lanne et al. (2016) have shown that the
SVAR model can be uniquely identied by statistical properties of the
data. However, their model is only statistically, as opposed to economi-
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cally, identied, and additional information is needed to give the shocks an
economic interpretation. This information may come in the form of short-
run on long-run restrictions that can also easily be tested in the framework
of Lanne et al. (2016), and if not rejected, used for interpretation. How-
ever, as discussed in the Introduction, in the UMP literature, identifying
restrictions are typically sign restrictions that are not approached in a
straightforward manner by classical methods, and to that end, we employ
the Bayesian procedures recently devised by Lanne and Luoto (2016). In
particular, they show how to assess the plausibility of a set of sign restric-
tions by their posterior probability, and we apply their approach to check
the sign restrictions used in a number of previous empirical UMP studies.
Our empirical results are based on the following n-variate SVAR(p)
model
yt= a + A1yt 1+   +Apyt p+B"t; (1)
where yt is an (n1) vector of time series of interest, a (n1) is an intercept
term,A1:::;Ap are (nn) coe¢ cient matrices and the (nn) impact matrix
B, containing the contemporaneous relations of the structural errors "t, is
assumed nonsingular. The (n 1) error term "t is a sequence of stationary
random vectors such that each component "it; i = 1; :::; n is independent in
time with zero mean and nite positive variance. It is also assumed that
the components "it are mutually independent, and at most one of them has
a Gaussian marginal distribution.
Lanne et al. (2016) show that under the non-Gaussianity and indepen-
dence assumptions of the structural error term "t, the matrix B is uniquely
identied up to permutation and scaling of its columns. Changing the or-
der of the columns of B means a di¤erent ordering of the structural shocks
"it:
If the process yt satises the stability condition
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det(In  A1z       Apzp) 6= 0; jzj 6 1(z 2 C);
then the SVAR(p) model (1) has a moving average representation
yt = +
1X
j=0
	jB"t j; (2)
where  is the unconditional expectation of yt, 	0 is the identity matrix
and 	j; j = 1; 2; ::: are obtained recursively as 	j = 
j
l=1	j lAl. Interest
then lies in the matrices 	jB  j; j = 0; 1; :::, the kth column of which
contains the impulse responses of the kth structural shock "it; i = 1; :::; n.4
In this paper, we are only interested in the unconventional monetary
policy shock. In other words, our goal is to nd out whether there is a
single shock among the n statistically identied ones that satises the sign
restrictions imposed in each of the previous studies that we consider. If such
a shock can indeed be found, we compare its impulse responses to those
of the original study. To that end, we employ the Bayesian procedure of
Lanne and Luoto (2016). We start out by estimating the joint posterior
distribution of the parameters of the unrestricted SVAR model (1), and
then compute the posterior distribution of the reduced-form impulse re-
sponse matrices 	j; j 2 L, where L consists of indices of the restricted
impulse responses. For instance, if the sign restrictions are imposed on the
rst q + 1 impulse responses, L = f0; 1; :::; qg.5 Because any or none of
4Although the MA-representation (2) does not exist for integrated VAR(p) processes,
their impulse responses are given by the same recursion. A similar decomposition exists
for I(1) variables and is known as the Beveridge-Nelson decomposition (see Lütkepohl
2006, Section 6.1).
5Because di¤erent permutations ofB produce the same shocks and impulse responses,
the choice of the permutation does not matter. Just to ensure that the whole analysis is
based on the same ordering of the shocks, the permutation of the columns of B is xed
(for details, see Lanne and Luoto 2016).
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the n components of "t can satisfy the restrictions and hence be the struc-
tural shock of interest, we next compute the conditional probability of each
shock "it; i = 1; :::; n satisfying the restrictions, conditional on none of the
others satisfying them. In practice this is done using the posterior distri-
bution of the identied structural impulse responses j = 	jB; j 2 L.
For each i 2 f1; :::; ng, this probability can be interpreted as the posterior
probability of the restricted SVAR model where the sign restrictions are
imposed on the ith column of the j; j 2 L matrices only. Among the n
models, those satisfying the sign restrictions in the (true) data-generating
process (DGP) are expected to have high posterior probabilities. There-
fore, one can rank the SVAR models satisfying the restrictions by their
posterior probabilities, and so nd a shock that is most likely the shock of
interest.6 The economic shocks with the gratest probability can be given
the economic interpretation related to the corresponding restrictions. On
the other hand, if the sum of the posterior probabilities is small, i.e. all
of the models take a negligible probability, we can conclude that the data
does not lend support to the restrictions.
It is important to realize that apart from facilitating the assessment
of the plausibility of the restrictions, our non-Gaussian SVAR framework
has a number of other benets compared to the conventional approach to
sign restrictions. In the standard setting the matrix B cannot be identi-
ed without restrictions such as sign restrictions which are popular in both
conventional and unconventional monetary policy literature. The draw-
back of sign-identied SVAR models is that they are only set-identied,
which means that the posterior of the structural parameters is propor-
tional to the prior and hence an uninformative prior cannot be used. In
fact, Baumeister and Hamilton (2015) have recently shown that the results
6The procedure described here can be generalized to the case of multiple structural
shocks, see Lanne and Luoto (2016).
7
from sign-identied SVARs are driven by the (implicit) priors. In contrast,
under our assumptions the impulse responses are point-identied so that
their posterior distributions need not be driven by the priors. Because of
point-identication an uninformative prior can be used, and this facilitates
learning about the impulse responses from the data.
3 Empirical Analysis of Unconventional Mon-
etary Policy
The Bank of Japans (BoJ), the Federal Reserves (Fed) and the European
Central Banks (ECB) actions mainly di¤er because of di¤erences in the
structures of the economies and nancial markets in particular. While
the euro area and Japan are bank-centric economies, bond markets play an
important role in the United States. The respective central banks therefore
provided liquidity and support to di¤erent segments of the nancial sector:
the Fed concentrated on bond purchases, the ECB on lending directly to
banks, and the BoJs strategy involved both.
Most UMP measures consist of an active use of the central banksbal-
ance sheet (Borio and Disyatat 2010), which is therefore a natural gauge
for UMP although other measures have also been used in the literature. In
line with our reference studies, the policy instruments are the reserves for
the BoJ and central bank assets for the Fed and the ECB. The reason is
that we analyze the Japanese monetary policy of the early 2000s, when the
BoJ had an explicit target for reserves, whereas the Feds and the ECBs
actions focus on the asset side of the balance sheet.
Although the major central banksunconventional measures were only
undertaken after the nancial crisis, a few studies are based on longer sam-
ples (e.g. Lenza et al. 2010, Peersman 2011). These also include nonlinear
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model specications and policy instruments di¤erent from those discussed
above (Darracq-Paries and De Santis 2015, Baumeister and Benati 2013,
Kapetanios et al. 2012). Since UMP measures are only undertaken when
the economy faces particularly di¢ cult times (Martin and Milas 2012),
utilizing data far beyond such a period may not be adequate to assess the
e¤ects of those measures (Boeckx et al. 2016, Gambacorta 2014). There-
fore our samples cover periods over which UMP was in use and the central
banks had macroeconomic goals. A detailed description of the data is de-
ferred to an appendix.
We now provide a few details concerning the practical implementation,
and then present the results of the formal assessment of previously used
identication schemes and analyze impulse response functions in each geo-
graphical area in turn.
3.1 The set-up
We rst identify structural shocks statistically and, following Lanne and
Luoto (2016) then proceed to formally assess the validity of the sign re-
strictions used by Schenkelberg and Watzka (2013) for Japan, Gambacorta
et al. (2014) for the US and Boeckx et al. (2016) for the euro area. As
the data turns out to lend support to the restrictions, we then move on to
impulse response analysis of the economic shocks.
We assume that the ith independent component of the error vector
"it follows a univariate Students t distribution with i degrees of freedom.
Non-Gaussianity is required for identication, as discussed in Section 2, and
we provide evidence that the fat-tailed t distribution is in fact a suitable
assumption for the errors.
Point identication facilitates incorporating any prior information in
Bayesian estimation. However, in order to learn as much as possible about
the impulse responses from the data, we use non-informative priors. We
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assume an exponential prior distribution with mean 5 and variance 25 for
each degree of freedom parameter i and a Gaussian prior for the inverse of
the error impact matrix vec(B 1)  b, b  N(b,Vb) where V 1b = cbIn2
and cb = 0, which results in an uninformative (improper) prior for B 1,
p(B 1) / 1. For the deterministic terms and coe¢ cient matrices, col-
lected in matrix A = [a;A
0
1; :::; A
0
p]
0, vec(A)  a, we assume a normal
prior distribution, i.e. a  N(a;Va) with a= 0 and Va = 100002Ipn2+n.
For the US and the euro area we also present results based on a relatively
more informative prior for vec(A), which corresponds to the standard Min-
nesota/Litterman prior.
3.2 Japan
The burst of the asset price bubble in the early 1990s in Japan led the
Bank of Japan (BoJ) to be the rst central bank to adopt the zero-interest
rate policy. In March 2001 the BoJ changed its main operating target from
the overnight call rate to the outstanding current account balances (CABs)
held at the BoJ (Honda et al. 2013).7 In contrast to most central banks the
operating target of the BoJ was on the liability side of its balance sheet.
The BoJ set explicit targets for bank reserves, committed to maintain high
reserves levels in the future and increased the outright purchases of long-
term government bonds in order to attain the target on bank reserves (Ugai
2007, Borio and Disyatat 2010).
We adopt the specication in Schenkelberg andWatzka (2013) who have
analyzed the real e¤ects of the Japanese unconventional monetary policy
at the ZLB using post-1995 data in a sign-restricted BVAR. The Japanese
data, plotted in Figure 1, are analyzed with a ve-variable structural BVAR
7Current account balances is the technical term for the part of the monetary base
that consists of the bank reserves held at the BoJ.
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model with an intercept and a trend.8 Monthly data for Japan spans from
March 1995 until September 2010.9 The variables included are the core
consumer price index (CPI), the Japanese industrial production index (IP),
the bank reserves held at the Bank of Japan (RES), the 10-year yield of
Japanese government bonds (LTY) and the real e¤ective exchange rate of
Yen against other currencies (EXR). Except for the long-term yield, all
variables are expressed in logs. Given that we analyze the same variables
and sample period as Schenkelberg and Watzka (2013), we follow them and
include six lags in the VAR model.
Figure 1: Plot of logarithmic (excl. long-term yield) time series 1995M3
2010M9 for Japan.
In the present setup, the impact matrix B in (1) is uniquely identied
under non-Gaussianity of at least four components of the error vector. The
strength of the identication can easily be checked because a t-distributed
random variable converges to a Gaussian as the number of degrees of free-
8The results are qualitatively the same with linearly detrended data and no trend in
the model.
9The BoJ reintroduced QE measures  money market operations to increase the
monetary base  in 2013 as part of the Abenomicsstrategy. Since a linear model is
not suitable to study a sample period which includes a change in the monetary policy
regime, the sample cannot be extended to include the Abenomicsperiod.
11
dom goes to innity. Hence, small values indicate (strong) identication.
The posterior means of the degree-of-freedom parameters of the univariate
t distributions specied for the components of the error term lying between
2.2 and 4.6 thus provide evidence of successful identication.
To study the e¤ects of unconventional monetary policy on output and
price level, we need to pin down the right structural shock among the sta-
tistically identied ones. For that purpose we exploit the sign restrictions
used by Schenkelberg and Watzka (2013) who assume that an expansionary
UMP shock has a positive e¤ect on the reserves held at the BoJ and a non-
negative e¤ect on consumer prices for 12 months.10 Given the arbitrariness
of the 12-month restriction horizon of Schenkelberg and Watzka (2013), we
rst compute the posterior probability of each structural shock satisfying
the restrictions on impact only (h = 0), and then for the cases h = 0; 1 and
h = 0; :::; 12. The results are reported in the left panel of Table 1. The
sums of the posterior probabilities for these di¤erent cases range between
0.14 and 0.41, lending overall support to the restrictions irrespective of the
horizon although the evidence is clearly weaker when the restrictions are
required to hold for an entire year. Moreover, there is only one shock ("3t)
with a high posterior probability when only the impact e¤ect is restricted.
It is found the likeliest candidate for the UMP shock also when the rst two
impulse responses are restricted although "1t seems to be almost equally
likely. Only in the case h = 0; ::; 12 the restrictions fail to pin down the
shock. These results altogether speak in favor of a unique labeling of the
UMP shock so that impulse responses can be analyzed. This labeling turns
out to be robust to two alternative specications, which we consider next.
10The identication scheme in Schenkelberg and Watzka (2013) contains an additional
contemporaneous zero restriction on consumer prices to disentangle the UMP-shock from
demand and supply shocks. This is not required in our setup because identication is
based on statistical properties of the data.
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Table 1: Formal assessment of sign restrictions: Japan
Benchmark model Shorter sample
Shock h = 0 h = 0; 1 h = 0; ::; 12 h = 0 h = 0; 1 h = 0; ::; 12
"1t 0.04 0.12 0.05 0.01 0.08 0.02
"2t 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.03 0.12 0.05
"3t 0.20 0.13 0.04 0.15 0.16 0.24
"4t 0.02 0.05 0.03 0.00 0.02 0.01
"5t 0.09 0.07 0.01 0.01 0.07 0.03
Sum 0.37 0.41 0.14 0.20 0.45 0.35
Notes: The gures in the top panel are the posterior probabilities of shock "it; i =
1; :::; 5 satisfying the sign restrictions that the reserves be positive and consumer prices
be non-negative for various time horizons, and hence being the structural shock of
interest. Benchmark model: reserves as the policy instrument. Shorter sample: sample
period 2000M32007M3.
Figure 2 depicts the median impulse responses to a unit UMP shock
along with the 16% and 84% percentiles of the posterior distribution.12
The UMP shock raises reserves approximately 3%, industrial production
at most 0.15% after about two years but the impact on the price level
and long-term government yield are insignicant. The e¤ect on the real
exchange rate is positive but barely signicant.
In contrast to previous studies, these impulse response functions are
obtained without restricting the e¤ects on any of the variables and are
solely based on the data. Therefore it is interesting to compare the results
with those of Schenkelberg and Watzka (2013). It is worth noting that
their response of reserves is of the same shape and persistence as ours, and
they also nd a virtually insignicant e¤ect of the UMP shock on the real
exchange rate. On the other hand, their price response is weakly positive
and temporary, while we nd it to be insignicant also during the rst
12Unlike with the impulse responses based on conventional sign restrictions, because
of point identication, we are able to set the size of the shock. Furthermore, as unique
impulse response functions are produced the conventional pointwise posterior median
impulse responses and error bands can be reported.
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Figure 2: Impulse responses to an expansionary UMP shock: Japan
1995M32010M9. Median responses (solid lines) together with 68%
Bayesian credible sets (dashed lines).
year, when they restricted it non-negative. There is also a small di¤er-
ence in the negative impact response of industrial production, which only
we nd signicant, but it is temporarily positive after 20 months in both
studies. However the main di¤erence is in the reaction of the long-term
government bond yield, which Schenkelberg and Watzka (2013) report to
be signicantly negative for two years, whereas we observe a signicantly
positive, although very weak (one basis point), transient response of ap-
proximately six months. This nding is particularly interesting because
asset purchases, which the BoJ engaged in to attain its target on reserves,
are typically thought to work by lowering long-term rates.
As a robustness check we analyze a model with interpolated real GDP
14
(instead of the industrial production), which has been used as a measure of
aggregate output in Gambacorta et al. (2014) and Boeckx et al. (2016). A
monthly measure of real GDP was constructed using the Chow-Lin interpo-
lation method with monthly industrial production as a reference series. We
observe that a similar pattern of probabilities emerges as in the previous
specication: requiring reserves and the CPI to be non-negative on impact
only uniquely identies the UMP shock, while there are other shocks with
positive probabilities in the case h = 0; 1, and no labeling is clearly sup-
ported for twelve months (posterior probabilities range from 0.02 to 0.05).
There are also no major di¤erences in the impulse responses compared to
the benchmark case.13
As another robustness check, we follow Schenkelberg andWatzka (2013)
and consider a shorter sample period ranging from March 2000 to March
2007.14 The sample period covers approximately a year before and after
the BoJ targeted current account balances. In fact, one could argue that
although the BoJs target rate was very close to zero since 1995, starting to
target reserves marks the beginning of a di¤erent monetary policy regime.
The posterior probabilities reported in the right panel of Table 1 show that,
interestingly, the same shock ("3t) is uniquely identied as the UMP shock
for all restrictions horizons.
The impulse response functions, shown in Figure 3, are aligned with
the short sample results in Schenkelberg and Watzka (2013). Their price
response became insignicant as well, their response of real exchange rate
turned from insignicant to positive, and in both studies the signicant out-
put e¤ect occurs earlier than in the benchmark case. Interestingly, the main
di¤erence remains: we observe an insignicant e¤ect on the long-term rate,
13The detailed results of the robustness analysis are not reported here to save space
but are available upon request.
14With the shorter sample lag length is set to p = 2.
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while they documented an initial negative e¤ect which then turns positive.
We therefore conclude that our results are robust to the alternative output
measure but shortening the sample period triggers sharper responses in
output and real exchange rate, while the e¤ect on the long term yield can
be considered negligible in both cases.
Figure 3: Impulse responses to an expansionary UMP shock: Japan.
Shorter sample period 2000M32007M3. Median responses (solid lines)
together with 68% Bayesian credible sets (dashed lines).
To summarize, the sign restrictions in Schenkelberg and Watzka (2013)
are supported by the data on impact and after the rst month following
the shock, but they are not able to uniquely identify the UMP shock when
imposed for an entire year, except for the shorter sample period. This
allows us to pin down the right structural shock among the statistically
identied ones and to conduct impulse response analysis.
Importantly, because we do not impose a positive price response, we are
16
able to conclude that a UMP shock has no e¤ect on the price level. This
is in contrast to Schenkelberg and Watzka (2013) who forced the shock to
have a positive e¤ect for twelve months. They also documented a negative
e¤ect on the long-term government bond yield, whereas in our case posi-
tive, although very small values (one basis point) are included in the 68%
posterior error bands. Our ndings are robust to a di¤erent output mea-
sure but not entirely to a shorter sample period. The results indicate that
the Japanese monetary policy with an explicit target for reserves had no
e¤ect on the core consumer price index. The policy managed to stimulate
real economic activity with a delay but there is no strong evidence that it
operated by lowering long-term interest rates.
3.3 United States
In the aftermath of the 2007-09 nancial crisis, when short interest rates
were approaching their e¤ective zero lower bound, the Fed, the ECB and
other major central banks started to pursue less conventional monetary
policies to restore nancial and macroeconomic stability. Initially both
central banks actions focused on dysfunctional nancial markets, while
broader macroeconomic conditions soon became the targets.
Due to the collapse of the housing price bubble and the related sub-
prime crisis in the US, the Fed prioritized housing credit markets within
its large scale asset purchase (LSAP) programs. In the rst phase it pur-
sued outright asset purchases of government-sponsored enterprise (GSE)
debt, mortgage-backed securities (MBS) and long-term Treasury securi-
ties. Fears of disination and sluggish economic recovery led the Fed to
increase its purchases of US Treasuries at several stages during the sam-
ple period. Although some of the operations were sterilized, i.e. left the
monetary base una¤ected, most of them were unsterilized (for details, see
Fawley and Neely 2013).
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The existing literature on the macroeconomic e¤ects of the Feds bal-
ance sheet operations (Gambacorta et al. 2014, Meinusch and Tillmann
2016, Weale and Wieladek 2016) uses di¤erent Bayesian VAR specica-
tions (panel VAR, Qual VAR and SVAR, respectively), but obtains the
same result for the key macroeconomic variables; an expansionary UMP
shock leads to a temporary signicant rise in output and prices.
The Feds rst large scale asset purchase program (LSAP) was only
expanded from $600 billion to $1.75 trillion in March 2009 (Martin and
Milas 2012), and therefore our monthly four-variable dataset for the US,
plotted in Figure 4, covers the period 2009M3-2014M5. Although with
a di¤erent set of variables, Weale and Wieladek (2016) were the rst to
analyze this sample, which does not span beyond the UMP period and is,
hence, less susceptible to the Lucas Critique. To capture the main features
of the crisis (Gambacorta et al. 2014) the variables included in the BVAR
are the log of seasonally adjusted real GDP (GDP)15, the log of seasonally
adjusted consumer price index (CPI), the log of seasonally adjusted central
bank assets (CBA) and the level of implied stock market volatility (VIX)
to control for the central banks balance sheet expansion resulting from
nancial market disturbances.
We specify a BVAR(2) with a constant consisting of the four variables.16
With four variables, non-Gaussianity of at least three components of the
error vector is crucial for identication. The posterior means of the degree-
of-freedom parameters of the t distributions of the error terms turned out
to range from 2.8 to 4.2, lending support to fat-tailed error distributions
and, hence, successful identication.
In order to nd out whether any of the statistically identied shocks
15A monthly measure of real GDP is constructed using the Chow-Lin interpolation
procedure with industrial production and retail sales as reference series.
16Also Weale and Wiedalek (2016) use p = 2 for this sample period.
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Figure 4: Plot of logarithmic (excl. VIX) time series 2009M32014M5 for
the US.
can be labeled as the monetary policy shock, we proceed with a formal
assessment of the sign restrictions in Gambacorta et al. (2014) whereby
an expansionary UMP shock increases central bank assets but does not
increase stock market volatility on impact and one month after the shock.18
Again in the absence of a clear justication for the restriction horizon we
check the validity of the signs on impact only (h = 0) as well as for the case
h = 0; 1. The results reported in the left panel of Table 2 show that there
is not much di¤erence between the posterior probabilities in the two cases.
The sums of the posterior probabilities (0.12 and 0.16) lend overall support
to the restrictions. Moreover, there is in both cases only one shock ("4t)
with a high posterior probability, with the probability of the other shocks
virtually zero, so that a UMP shock can be regarded as uniquely identied
in probability.
The impulse responses, plotted in Figure 5, show that a unit UMP shock
increases the central bank assets on impact but the median peak response
18Gambacorta et al. (2014) and Boeckx et al. (2016) impose additional contemporane-
ous zero restrictions on output and consumer prices to reduce the number of admissible
impulse responses and so to sharpen identication. These are not required in our setup
because the model is uniquely identied based on statistical properties of the data.
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Table 2: Formal assessment of sign restrictions: United States
Benchmark model Industrial production Monetary base
Shock h = 0 h = 0; 1 h = 0 h = 0; 1 h = 0 h = 0; 1
"1t 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.03
"2t 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02
"3t 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.03
"4t 0.11 0.16 0.05 0.11 0.39 0.42
Sum 0.12 0.19 0.06 0.16 0.43 0.50
Notes: The gures in the table are the posterior probabilities of shock "it; i = 1; :::4
satisfying the sign restrictions that the central bank assets be nonnegative and the
VIX be nonpositive for various time horizons, and hence being the structural shock of
interest. The gures on the bottom line are the sums of the posterior probabilities.
Benchmark model: central bank assets as policy instrument. Industrial production:
Industrial production as a measure of aggregate output. Monetary base: monetary base
as policy instrument.
of 1% occurs after approximately eight months. While Gambacorta et al.
(2014) forced output and prices to respond with a lag and documented
peak responses after six months, and Weale and Wiedalek (2016) found
output and prices to rise for 2040 months after a UMP shock regardless
of the identication scheme, our unrestricted impulse response functions
indicate that the output response turns sigicantly positive only after ten
months. We also observe a more persistent output response, lasting up to
35 months. In contrast, the evidence for a positive CPI response is weaker,
as the 68% Bayesian credible sets just include the zero line.
Taking into account the very small sample size, we also considered a
more informative prior distribution, corresponding to the standard Min-
nesota/Litterman prior. Interestingly, Figure 6 shows that the relatively
more informative prior results in a positive price response after 30 months,
with the rest of the responses unaltered. Moreover, further tightening the
prior made the positive price response to occur even earlier, but still much
later than previously found.
To check the robustness of our results, we considered industrial produc-
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Figure 5: Impulse responses to an expansionary UMP shock: US 2009M3
2014M5. Median responses (solid lines) together with 68% Bayesian cred-
ible sets (dashed line).
tion as a measure of output and monetary base as the quantitative policy
instrument. The middle and right panels of Table 2 show that the label-
ing is robust both variables and the same shock ("4t) is uniquely identied
in probability. There are, however, di¤erences in the impulse response
functions compared to the benchmark specication.19 Interestingly, when
industrial production is used, the positive CPI response becomes signicant
after 30 months even when a non-informative prior is used, while the rest
of the responses remain the same. Again, tightening the prior has the same
e¤ect in that the CPI response becomes signicantly positive earlier.
On the other hand, unlike documented by Gambacorta et al. (2014)
and what we found for Japan and the euro area (see Section 3.4), the
results from the impulse response analysis for the US are not robust to
an alternative quantitative policy instrument (monetary base). Although
the posterior probabilities in Table 2 indicate that the sign restrictions are
supported by the data, the impulse responses of the two macrovariables
19These impulse response functions are not shown here to save space but are available
upon request.
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Figure 6: Impulse responses to an expansionary UMP shock: US 2009M3
2014M5. Informative prior. Median responses (solid lines) together with
68% Bayesian credible sets (dashed line).
of interest are statisticallly insignicant. Furthermore, only a very tight
prior triggers a signicant positive output response similar to the previous
specications, while the price response remains insignicant. This nding
is consistent with the fact that the e¤ectiveness of balance sheet policies
does not hinge on an accompanying change in the monetary base (Borio
and Disyatat 2010), and as already noted by Gambacorta et al. (2014),
monetary base expanded less than central bank assets in the US over part
of the sample period. It also indicates that di¤erences between countries
make panel methods less suitable to study the country-specic impact of
unconventional monetary policies.
3.4 Euro area
Similarly to the Fed, the ECBs asset purchase programs aimed to improve
the functioning of specic markets. The covered bond purchase program
(CBPP) stimulated the issuance of covered bonds, and therefore eased fund-
ing conditions for banks (Beirne et al. 2011), whereas the objective of the
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Securities Markets Program (SMP) later replaced by Outright Monetary
Transactions (OMT) was to address the malfunctioning of the securities
markets caused by the sovereign debt crisis.20 Apart from the SMP and
its follower OMT, the majority of the ECBs operations during the sample
period consisted of providing funding for banks. The ECB expanded both
the availability and maturity of bank loans as well as eased the conditions
for receiving funding on several occasions. Its asset purchases were modest
in size and mostly sterilized, reversing their e¤ects on the monetary base.
Figure 7: Plot of logarithmic (excl. CISS) time series 2007M12014M12
for the euro area.
To investigate the e¤ectiveness of the policy measures that expand the
ECBs balance sheet, we adopt the VAR model specication of Boeckx
et al. (2016)21. The monthly ECB data, plotted in Figure 7, spans from
January 2007 until December 2014. Although the ECB has continued its
unconventional policies beyond this date, we follow Boeckx et al. (2016)
and end the sample period before the beginning of the Expanded Asset
Purchase Program (EAPP).
20See the 5.10.2010 ECB press release www.ecb.eu/press/pr/date/2010/html/pr100510.en.html
21As Boeckx et al. (2016) build on Gambacorta et al. (2014), also our study is related
to theirs, with the di¤erence of a longer sample period and the use of the CISS variable
to measure overall nancial stress in the euro area.
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The vector of endogenous variables comprises the log of seasonally ad-
justed real GDP (GDP), the log of seasonally adjusted consumer price
index (CPI), the log of seasonally adjusted central bank assets (CBA) and
the level of the Composite Indicator of Systemic Stress (CISS). Boeckx
et al. (2016) also included in their model the main renancing operations
(MRO) policy rate and the spread between the EONIA and the MRO-rate.
However with six variables the number of parameters to estimate increases
considerably when no restrictions are imposed, and because of the short
sample period this obviously creates problems in estimation.22
Table 3: Formal assessment of sign restrictions: Euro area
Benchmark model Monetary base
Shock h = 0 h = 0; 1 h = 0 h = 0; 1
"1t 0.17 0.19 0.07 0.08
"2t 0.25 0.28 0.34 0.38
"3t 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.05
"4t 0.06 0.04 0.16 0.16
Sum 0.54 0.56 0.61 0.67
Notes: The gures in the table are the posterior probabilities of shock "it; i = 1; :::4
satisfying the sign restrictions that the central bank assets be nonnegative and the
CISS be nonpositive for various time horizons, and hence being the structural shock
of interest. The gures on the bottom line are the sums of the posterior probabilities.
Benchmark model: central bank assets as policy instrument. Monetary base: monetary
base as policy instrument.
We include a constant and two lags in the VAR model.24 The posterior
22In fact, with six variables the method adopted in this paper yielded results that
did not allow us to make any conclusions even when using a very tight prior. Because
one of the advantages of the method is the ability to check the compatibility with the
data of the restrictions imposed in the conventional approach, we choose to stick to
the 4-variable specication. Moreover, our conclusions turn out to be similar to those
obtained by Boeckx et al. (2016) and most di¤erences can be seen to follow from (the
absense of) restrictions.
24Our results are robust to p = 3 used in Boeckx et al. (2016) although the IRFs are
somewhat smoother with p = 2.
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means of the degree-of-freedom parameters of the t distributions specied
for the components of the error term between 2.3 and 5.6 suggest that
identication based on non-Gaussianity of the errors has once again been
achieved. We therefore proceed with the formal assessment of the sign re-
strictions in Boeckx et al. (2016), who assume that a UMP shock increases
the balance sheet of the ECB but does not increase nancial stress. The
restrictions are imposed on impact and in the rst month after the shock.
The results reported in the left panel of Table 3 show that the restric-
tions are supported by the data and two of the shocks ("1t and "2t) receive
a relatively high probability (0.17 and 0.25, respectively). The results do
not depend on the horizon over which the restrictions are imposed, and
we regard "2t maximizing the posterior probability as our UMP shock of
interest.
Figure 8: Impulse responses to an expansionary UMP shock: Euro area
2007M12014M12. Median responses (solid lines) together with 68%
Bayesian credible sets (dashed lines).
An inspection of the impulse responses in Figure 8 reveals that a unit
UMP shock results in an increase in the ECB assets of approximately 0.4%
on impact, leads to a signicant increase in output and an (insignicant)
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initial decline in the CISS indicator.25 The main di¤erence with Boeckx et
al. (2016) or the country-level results in Gambacorta et al. (2014) is the
response of prices, which they found to be signicantly positive persistently,
while we nd no signicant e¤ect. In contrast, the size of the output e¤ect
is similar to theirs, lasting less than a year. Given that our results are
obtained without restrictions, it is interesting to note that also the timing
of the output response di¤ers from Gambacorta et al. (2014) and Boeckx et
al. (2016). Specically, when the impact response is not ruled out ex ante,
a positive output response is found to occur earlier than reported in these
previous studies. While Boeckx et al. (2016) found output to peak after
eight months and Gambacorta et al. (2014) after three months, according
to our results output peaks immediately.
Figure 9: Impulse responses to an expansionary UMP shock: Euro area
2007M12014M12. Informative prior. Median responses (solid lines) to-
gether with 68% Bayesian credible sets (dashed lines).
25The normalization rule used to compute the posterior probabilities reported in Table
3 generates bimodal posterior distributions for the impulse response functions, resulting
in error bands that do not properly reect parameter uncertainty (see Waggoner and Zha
2003). For the error bands to be informative about the reliability of the estimates, we
report impulse responses computed with a di¤erent normalization rule which, however,
does not a¤ect the posterior probabilities.
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Taking into account the relatively small sample size and the implicit
tight priors of conventional sign-identied SVARs, we also considered a
more informative prior distribution. The impulse response functions re-
ported in Figure 9 show that the relatively more informative prior results
in a positive transient price response after 18 months, whereas the rest of
the responses remain unaltered.
We checked the robustness of our results with respect to the monetary
base instead of central bank assets as the monetary policy instrument.
The right panel of Table 3 shows that the UMP shock is more sharply
identied in that the posterior probability of the likeliest shock ("2t) is
greater when monetary base is used instead of central bank assets as the
quantitative policy instrument, conrming that this shock indeed is our
UMP shock of interest. The results from the impulse response analysis
are robust with respect to the alternative instrument save one interesting
exception: a positive price response occurs already after one year even
when a non-informative prior is used, i.e. the analysis is solely based on
the data.26
The latter nding is in contrast to Boeckx et al. (2016), whose price re-
sponse proved robust to the alternative policy instrument. Nonetheless, the
authors point out an important di¤erence between the two variables: the
ECBs asset purchases were mostly sterilized and hence are not included
in the monetary base. As a consequence the evolution of the European
Monetary Unions monetary base reects extensions of the long term re-
nancing operations (LTROs) only (Fawley and Neely 2013). This can
explain our nding that central bank assets and monetary base had a dif-
ferent impact on the price level and suggests that extending the maturity
of the longer bank loans showed up sooner in the euro area consumer prices
26These impulse response functions are not shown here to save space but are available
upon request.
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than purchases of private assets or government bonds.
4 Conclusions
We have applied a novel Bayesian SVAR identication method due to Lanne
and Luoto (2016) to estimate the macroeconomic e¤ects of the Bank of
Japans, the Federal Reserves and the European Central Banks balance
sheet operations. The procedure exploits non-Gaussianity and indepen-
dene of the structural error terms to uniquely identify the shocks as in
Lanne et al. (2016). In contrast to the SVAR models identied by sign
restrictions, our model and the impulse responses are point-identied. This
entails a number of advantages over the conventional approach to sign re-
strictions. Importantly, instead of being forced to impose the set of sign
restrictions used in the previous literature, we are able to formally assess
their plausibility against the data.
According to our results, the sign restrictions used in the previous lit-
erature were mostly supported by the data. However, unlike previous lit-
erature, we found an expansionary unconventional monetary policy shock
to have di¤erent macroeconomic e¤ects in the three geographical areas.
Not only the timing, persistence and statistical signicance of the output
and price responses varied from country to country but also the robustness
of the results to alternative variables used in the literature. Although we
looked at policies that expand each central banks balance sheet, the policy
instrument encompassess di¤erent operations for each central bank, which
therefore turned out to have di¤erent economy-wide e¤ects.
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Appendix: Data
The data have been retrieved from the FRED database provided by the Fed-
eral Reserve Bank of St Louis (https://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/), from
the Bank for International Settlements(BIS) website (www.bis.org), Bank
of Japans statistics (BOJ) website (http://www.boj.or.jp/en/statistics/index.htm/),
CBOE (www.cboe.com) and the ECB Statistical Data Warehouse (ECB)
(http://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/).
Series employed in the empirical analysis for Japan:
 Real e¤ective exchange rate (RNJP), BIS
 Core consumer price index (JPNCPICORMINMEI), FRED
 Industrial production (JPNPROINDMISMEI), FRED
 Average outstanding current account balances (BJMABS1AN113),
BOJ
 10-year government bond yield (IRLTLT01JPM156N), FRED
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 Real GDP (NAEXKP01JPQ661S), FRED
Series for the USA:
 Total Federal Reseve banks assets (WALCL), FRED
 Consumer price index (CPALTT01USM661S), FRED
 CBOE volatitily index (VIX), CBOE
 Industrial production (INDPRO), FRED
 Retail sales (RSXFS), FRED
 Monetary base (AMBSL), FRED
Series for the euro area:
 Central bank assets for the euro area (ECBASSETS), ECB
 Composite indicator of sovereign stress (CISS.M.U2.Z0Z.4F.EC.SOV_GDPW.IDX),
ECB
 Harmonized index of consumer prices (ICP.M.U2.Y.000000.3.INX),
ECB
 Real GDP (NAEXKP01EZQ661S), FRED
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